Abstract-This paper investigates data transmission and physical-layer secrecy in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We propose to apply full-duplex transmission and dual antenna selection at a secondary destination node. With the full-duplex transmission, the secondary destination node can simultaneously apply the receiving and jamming antenna selection to improve the secondary data transmission and primary secrecy performance, respectively. This describes an attractive scheme in practice: Unlike that in most existing approaches, the secrecy performance improvement in the CR network is no longer at the price of the data transmission loss. The outage probabilities for both the data transmission and physical-layer secrecy are analyzed. Numerical simulations are also included to verify the performance of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OGNITIVE RADIO (CR) improves spectrum utilization by sharing resources between primary and cognitive radio (secondary) users. Among various spectrum sharing schemes including underlay, overlay, and interweave, the underlay scheme is often of interest in practical implementation [1] . In the underlay approach, the secondary user is allowed to access the spectrum of the primary user if its interference to the primary user is below a certain level. It is known that the antenna selection provides an attractive approach in the underlay CR network [2] - [4] . In the CR antenna selection schemes, the "best" antenna with the least interference to the primary users and the strongest link for the secondary data transmission is often selected among a number of available antennas equipped at the secondary users.
An important issue that has attracted much attention recently is the physical-layer network security in the CR system. Unlike the traditional cryptographic security system [5] , the physicallayer network security is based on Shannon theory using channel coding to achieve secure transmission [6] - [11] . The physical-layer security has been investigated in various systems, including direct point-to-point transmission (e.g., in [12] ), distributed beamforming in cooperative networks (e.g., in [13] and [14] ), cooperative jamming (e.g., in [15] - [17] ), relay and jammer selection (e.g., in [18] - [20] ), and buffer-aided relay networks [21] . The physical-layer secrecy is of particularly interest in the CR network. This is because the primary users are designed to share the spectrum with secondary users, making it also "convenient" for eavesdroppers to intercept the informative data. In [22] , the secondary source is used as a jammer to improve the secrecy performance of the primary network. This is not a typical CR network as the secondary user does not transmit its own data. In [23] , a CR network with multiple secondary users is considered, where the secondary user that maximizes the secrecy performance of the secondary network is selected for data transmission. In [24] , transmission power is carefully allocated between the primary and secondary users to balance the primary and secondary secrecy rates. Similarly, in [25] , powers are optimally allocated to maximize the secrecy rate in a multiple-input-multiple-output cognitive network, which is achieved with distributed beamforming at the source or the relay. All of these approaches mainly focus on the physicallayer secrecy in the CR network. This motives us to investigate approaches that can improve the physical-layer secrecy and data transmission at the same time.
In this paper, we propose a dual antenna selection to improve data transmission in the secondary network and secrecy performance in the primary network simultaneously. This is achieved by equipping full-duplex multiple antennas at the secondary destination. Full-duplex transmission, which was previously considered difficult to implement due to the associated selfinterference, is now an attractive alternative in many applications because of the recent advances in the fields of antenna technology and signal processing [26] - [28] . In this paper, the receiving antenna selection at the secondary destination node is used to maximize the data transmission capacity in the secondary network. On the other hand, because of the fullduplex transmission, the transmission antenna selection is also used at the secondary destination to transmit jamming signals to the eavesdropper so that the secrecy capacity of the primary network is improved. With the full-duplex dual antenna selection at the secondary destination, unlike existing approaches, the secrecy and data transmission performance no longer have to compromise for each other but can be improved simultaneously. This describes a new way in applying full-duplex (in addition to its capability in increasing data rate), which is of particular interest in fifth-generation applications, including CR networks, device-to-device transmission, and small-cell systems.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• A full-duplex dual antenna selection scheme is proposed to improve the data transmission for the secondary network and secrecy performance for the primary network simultaneously. Both cases with and without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains are considered. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first attempt to improve simultaneously the secrecy and data transmission in the CR network.
• The closed-form expressions of the outage probability are derived for the secondary data transmission. The analysis shows that the receiving antenna selection provides diversity gain in the secondary data transmission.
• The upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability are derived for the primary network. The analysis shows that, even without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains, the jamming antenna selection can still improve the secrecy performance of the primary network.
• The secrecy diversity order and coding gain for the primary network are analyzed, leading to the conclusion that the secrecy performance improvement from the jamming antenna selection comes from the coding gain rather than the diversity gain. This is very different from the traditional antenna selection schemes for data transmission, where the performance gain is mainly from the diversity gain. The results provide a very useful insight in designing practical secrecy systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the dual antenna selection schemes. Section III analyzes the outage probability for the secondary data transmission. Section IV derives the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability for the primary network. Section V analyzes the secrecy diversity order and coding gain for the primary network. Section VI verifies the proposed antenna selection scheme with numerical simulations. Finally, Section VII summarizes this paper.
II. DUAL ANTENNA SELECTION AT
THE SECONDARY DESTINATION The system model of the secure cognitive network is shown in Fig. 1 , which consists of the primary network (including one primary source node PS and one primary destination PD), the secondary network (including one secondary source node SS and one secondary destination node SD), and one eavesdropper E. The secondary destination SD performs in the full-duplex mode and is equipped with multiple antennas, where there are K 1 antennas for receiving data from the secondary source and K 2 antennas for transmitting jamming signals to the eavesdropper. All other nodes are equipped with a single antenna and perform in the half-duplex mode.
We denote SD i and SD j as the ith and jth receiving and jamming antennas at node SD, where i = 1, . . . , K 1 and j = 1, . . . , K 2 , respectively. As shown in Fig. 1 , the channel 
The channel gains are denoted γ ab = |h ab | 2 correspondingly, which are independently exponentially distributed with mean of
Without losing generality, we assume the transmission power at PS and noise variances are all normalized to unity, and the channels are quasi-static so that the channel coefficients remain unchanged during one packet duration but independently vary from one packet time to another. We also assume the secondary users have knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) between the secondary and primary users. This can be achieved by feeding back CSI from the primary user to the secondary transmitter directly or indirectly by, for example, a band manager between the two parties [29] , or sensing pilot signals from primary users [30] .
A. Receiving Antenna Selection
The receiving antenna is selected with the best data transmission performance in the secondary network. Because the secondary destination SD operates in full-duplex mode, it receives data from the secondary source SS and transmit jamming signals to the eavesdropper E at the same time. If the jth jamming antenna SD j is selected, the received signal at the ith receiving antenna SD i is given by
where s s , s p , and s t are the transmission signals from nodes SS, PS, and SD j , respectively, and P ss and P sd are the transmission power at SS and SD, respectively. It is clear that the third term at the right-hand side of (1) is the residual self-interference from the SD j to SD i .
Then, the capacity for data receiving at SD i is given by
Considering that current technology can significantly suppress the self-interference to the noise level [31] , [32] , we assume that residual self-interference term P sd γ d i d i has little effect on C sd,i . Further assuming the channel SNR is high enough, we approximately have
In the underlay CR system, the interfering power from the secondary network to the primary destination must be below a certain level. Similar to those in [23] and [33] , the transmission powers of SS and SD can be constrained as P ss γ sp ≤ I th and P sd γ d j p ≤ I th , respectively. Then, replacing P ss in (3) with I th /γ sp gives
Thus, we propose that the receiving antenna at the secondary destination SD is selected, maximizing (4) such that
B. Jamming Antenna Selection
The jamming antenna is selected with the best secrecy performance in the primary network. In the following, we first derive the secrecy capacity for the primary network, from which the jamming selection rules are proposed.
1) Data Transmission Capacity at P D:
Because the secondary destination SD performs in the full-duplex mode, the secondary source SS transmits data, and SD transmits jamming signals at the same time. Thus, both SS and SD impose interference to the primary destination PD. If the jth antenna SD j is selected, the received signal at PD is given by
where n pd is the noise at node PD. Then, the capacity for data transmission at PD is obtained as
Using the CR power constraints in (7), we have
where the approximation holds at high SNR, and the jamming antenna index j is ignored because (8) holds for every SD j . We note that it is common to assume a high SNR in the physicallayer secrecy systems to focus on the secrecy performance (e.g., in [18] and [21] ).
2) Eavesdropping Capacity at E:
Due to the full-duplex transmission at SD, the eavesdropper receives signals from PS, SS and SD simultaneously. If the jth jamming antenna SD j is selected, the received signal at the eavesdropper E is given by
where n e is the noise at eavesdropper E.
While the jamming signal s t imposes interference on the eavesdropper E, the transmission from PS and SS forms an multiple-access channel at E. However, unlike the typical multiple-access channel, for the secrecy performance of the primary network, the eavesdropper intends to "intercept" the data from the primary source PS (and not that from the secondary source SS). Therefore, the eavesdropping capacity for the primary data s p detection is a piecewise function of the SS → E channel gain γ se , as shown in the following. We suppose the data rate of the secondary source SS is R data .
• If log 2 (1+(P ss γ se /(P sd γ d j e +1))) < R data , the SS→ E channel is too weak for the eavesdropper to decode the secondary data s s so that s s can only be treated as interference. Then, the eavesdropping capacity for the primary network is obtained as
• If log 2 (1 + (P ss γ se /(γ pe + P sd γ d j e + 1))) < R data < log 2 (1 + (P ss γ se /(P sd γ d j e + 1))), the eavesdropper can jointly decode the data from PS and SS. Considering that SS transmits at rate R data , the eavesdropping capacity for the primary network is obtained as
where the first term at the right-hand side of (11) is the "overall" capacity for the s p and s s detection. 
3) Secrecy Capacity: If the jth jamming antenna SD j is selected, the secrecy capacity [8] in the primary network is obtained as
where [a] + = max(a, 0). It is clear from (13) that, to have large secrecy capacity, the jamming antenna at the secondary destination need to be selected corresponding to large data transmission capacity C d at PD and small eavesdropping capacity C e,j at E, or the selected antenna has high "jamming" to E and low "interference" to PD. This again requires large |h d j e | 2 and small |h d j p | 2 , as shown in (7) and (10)- (12), respectively. Thus, we propose to select the jamming antenna with the largest ratio of γ d j e /γ d j p . In fact, as will be shown later in (25) and (26), this jamming antenna selection scheme maximizes the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy capacity.
4) Jamming Antenna Selection Rules:
We assume that the secondary destination SD is aware of the SD j → PD channel gains γ d j p . Then, depending on the knowledge of the SD j → E jamming channel gains, we propose two jamming antenna selection rules.
Case 1-If the knowledge of the SD j → E jamming channel gains is available, the jamming antenna is selected to satisfy
Case 2-If the knowledge of the SD j → E jamming channel gains is not available (which is often the case in practice), the jamming antenna is selected to satisfy
In the following, we drive the outage probabilities for the data transmission in the secondary network and secrecy performance in the primary network.
III. OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE SECONDARY DATA TRANSMISSION
Here, the outage probability of the data transmission in the secondary network is analyzed. If the ith receiving antenna SD i is selected at the secondary destination, the data transmission capacity in the secondary network is given by (4) when the channel SNR is high enough. Because the receiving antenna is selected from K 1 antennas, and from (5), the capacity for the data transmission is approximately given by
The outage probability for data transmission in the secondary network is then given by
where R data is the data rate at the secondary source SS. Substituting (16) into (17) and letting 
where F (·) is the cumulative density function (cdf).
The cdf of X 1 and the probability density function (pdf) of Y 1 can be obtained as
respectively, where N = λ sd /λ pd . Finally, substituting (19) into (18) gives
It is clear from (20) that the outage probability P s,out well depends on N , or a larger N leads to smaller outage probability. It is thus of interest to show the diversity order for the data transmission in the secondary network, which is defined as
We note that the definition in (21) is similar to that of the conventional diversity order, except that, now, the SNR is replaced with the parameter N . The diversity order defined in (21) reflects the decreasing rate of P s,out with respect to the receiving antenna number K 1 . Unfortunately, because (20) contains the Meijer G function MG(·), it is very hard to derive the diversity order. On the other hand, numerical results show that MG(·) has little effect on the diversity order. Then, ignoring the MG(·) term in (20) , we approximately have
This shows that the receiving antenna selection introduces diversity gain in the data transmission, which is similar to that in the traditional antenna selection schemes [4] . This result will be verified in the simulation later.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE PRIMARY NETWORK Here, the secrecy outage probability of the primary networks is analyzed. Both Cases 1 and 2, with and without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains, respectively, are considered. Because the eavesdropping capacity is a complicated piecewise function as shown in (10)- (12), it is hard (if not impossible) to obtain the closed-form expression of secrecy outage probability for the primary network. Instead, the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability are derived.
First, the maximum eavesdropping capacity for the primary source C e,j is obtained when the signals from SS has no effect on the eavesdropper to detect the data from PS. This happens when γ se = 0, or P ss γ se > (2 R data − 1)(γ pe + P sd γ d j e + 1) so that the SS → E link is strong enough for the eavesdropper to successfully decode SS and subtract it from the received signal.
Thus, when the jth jamming antenna is selected, the upper bound of the eavesdropping capacity is given by
On the other hand, we notice that when log(1 + (P ss γ se / (P sd γ d j e +1))) < R data , or P ss γ se < (2 R data −1)(P sd γ d j e + 1), the eavesdropper cannot decode s s so that the signals from SS is treated as interference. When P ss γ se > (2 R data − 1) (P sd γ d j e + 1), s s and s p (from SS and PS, respectively) can be jointly decoded. Therefore, the minimum eavesdropping capacity C e,j is reached when P ss γ se = (2 R data −1)(P sd γ d j e +1).
Substituting P ss γ se = (2 R data − 1)(P sd γ d j e + 1) into (10) then gives the lower bound of C e,j as
where Δ = 2 R data − 1. Recall that the capacity for data transmission at the primary destination PD is given by (8) . Then, substituting (8), (23), and (24) into (13), and with the CR power constraints, we obtain the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy capacity for the primary network (corresponding to the jth jamming antenna) as
respectively, where the approximation holds at the high SNR, which is often of interests in secrecy performance [18] . In the following, we drive the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability for Cases 1 and 2, respectively.
A. Case 1-With the Knowledge of the SD j → E Jamming Channel
The jamming antenna selection rule in Case 1 is shown in (14) .
1) Upper Bound-Case 1:
Noting that the jamming antenna is selected among K 2 antennas, and from (25) , the lower bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 1 is obtained as
Then, the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 1 is given by
where R secrecy is the target secrecy rate. We let X = max
Further noting that the cdf of the division of two random variables is given by (18) , the cdf of X and pdf of Y can be obtained as
respectively, where M = λ de /λ dp and L = λ pe /λ pp . The cdf of Z is then given by
Substituting (29) into (30) gives (31), shown at the bottom of the page. We note that there is no uniform format of F Z (z) with respect to the number of jamming antennas K 2 . However, the closed-form expression can be obtained for any given K 2 , some of which are shown in (31) .
Finally, from (28), the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability of the primary network is given by
where u = 2 R secrecy (2I th + 1)/I th .
2) Lower Bound-Case 1:
On the other hand, from (14) and (26) , the upper bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 1 is obtained as
Then, the lower bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 1 is given by
Following the same procedures as those in obtaining (32), we have
where v = 2 R secrecy (2I th +1)/(Δ·I th ), and F Z (·) is given by (32) .
B. Case 2-Without the Knowledge of the SD j → E Jamming Channel
The jamming antenna selection rule in Case 2 is given in (15 
The upper bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 2 is then given by
We let
Using the order statistics, the cdf of X 2 is obtained as
λ dp x 2 .
The pdfs of W 1 and Y 2 are given by
respectively. Further letting T 1 = X 2 W 1 , the cdf of T 1 is given by
Finally, we let Q = T 1 Y 2 and obtain the cdf of Q as
Lλ dp q λ dp qL−K 2 λ de −K 2 λ de ln λ dp qL
Comparing (37) and (41), we then have
where u = 2 R secrecy (2I th +1)/I th , and M and L are defined in (29) .
2) Lower Bound-Case 2:
From (26) and (15), the upper bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 2 is obtained as
Then, following the similar procedures as those in obtaining (42), we obtain the lower bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 2 as
where v = 2 R secrecy (2I th + 1)/(Δ · I th ).
V. ASYMPTOTICAL SECRECY PERFORMANCE
It is shown above that, in both Cases 1 and 2, the secrecy performance of the primary network depends on the ratio of M = λ de /λ dp , or a larger M results in better secrecy performance. In fact, M to the secrecy outage probability is similar as the SNR to the data transmission outage probability. Thus, it is of great interest to analyze the asymptotical secrecy performance, i.e., when M → ∞, how the secrecy performance varies with the number of jamming antenna K 2 . Similar to the conventional data transmission, the asymptotical secrecy performance includes the secrecy diversity order and coding gain.
When M → ∞, the secondary source SS transmission has little effect on the eavesdropping capacity so that the secrecy outage probability is close to the upper bound. Thus, the secrecy diversity order and coding gain can be defined based on the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability. To be specific, the secrecy diversity order is defined as
Similar to the classic diversity order, the secrecy diversity order reflects the decreasing rate of the secrecy outage probability with respect to the antenna number K 2 .
On the other hand, the secrecy coding gain can be defined as
where P (up) s,out (K) is the secrecy outage probability if there are K antenna available for jamming antennas selection, K 2 is the number of available jamming antennas, and K b is the number of jamming antennas in the baseline system for comparison. As will be shown in the following, we let K b = 2 and K b = 1 in Cases 1 and 2, respectively. It is clear from (46) that the secrecy coding gain reflects the "shift" of the secrecy outage probability with respect to the antenna number K 2 .
A. Case 1-With the Knowledge of the SD j → E Jamming Channel
From (31) and by ignoring the lower orders of M terms, we have
Substituting (47) into (45) gives the secrecy diversity order in Case 1. To be specific, if K 2 = 1, the secrecy diversity order is obtained as
If K 2 ≥ 2, the secrecy diversity order is given by
Combining (48) and (49), we obtain the secrecy diversity order in Case 1 as
On the other hand, as shown in (47) 
B. Case 2-Without the Knowledge of the SD j → E Jamming Channel
From (42) and by ignoring lower orders of M terms, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability for Case 2 is given by
Substituting ( (56)
C. Discussion
It is clear from (50) and (54) that, in both Cases 1 and 2, the secrecy diversity order is 1, or the decreasing rate of the secrecy outage probability with respect to M is always 1, no matter how many transmission jamming antennas are used at the secondary destination.
On the other hand, it is shown in (52) and (56) that, with more transmission jamming antenna for selection at the secondary destination, the secrecy outage performance still improves due to the coding gain. It is interesting to note that (52) and (56) are consistent because they are defined based on K b = 2 and K b = 1 as the baselines, respectively. Therefore, in both Cases 1 and 2, the jamming antenna selection at the secondary destination leads to the secrecy coding gain but not to the diversity gain. This contrasts sharply with the traditional antenna selection approaches for data transmission, where the diversity order usually goes up with the antenna number. The analysis also shows that, even without the knowledge of the SD → E jamming channel gains, the secrecy performance still improves with the jamming antenna selection.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Here, we provide theoretical and simulation results to verify the proposed dual antenna selection scheme in the CR network. In the simulation, the CR network consists of one pair of primary source PS and destination PD, and one pair of secondary source SS and destination SD. Except for SD, all nodes are equipped with a single antenna. While there are multiple antennas at SD, the antenna numbers are, respectively, set for different simulations. All channels are Rayleigh flat fading, and channel coefficients remains unchanged during one time slot but vary independently from one time slot to another. The average channel gains for different channel groups, PS → SD i , SS → SD i , SD i → E, and SD j → PD, respectively, can be different, but the channels within each of the above groups are independent and identically distributed. For example, the average channel gains for PS → SD 1 , . . . , PS → SD M are the same, but the average channel gains for PS → SD 1 and SS → SD 1 may be different. This describes a typical CR network, and the different average channel gains for each group represent different path loss for every node at various locations within the network. All simulation results are obtained by averaging over 1 000 000 independent runs. Other parameters including the data transmission rate and target secrecy rate are set individually for every simulation. Fig. 2 (a) and (b) shows the secrecy outage probability of the primary network versus target secrecy rate in Cases 1 and 2, respectively, where we set the number of jamming antenna as K 2 = 5; the average channel gains as λ pp = 55 dB, λ sp = λ pd = 20 dB, λ se = 10 dB, λ pe = 40 dB, λ de = 30 dB, λ dp = 20 dB, and λ dd = 1 dB; the interference constraint level at the primary destination as I th = 3; and the data transmission rate at the secondary source SS as R data = 2 b/s/Hz. Both the simulation results and theoretical upper and lower bounds are shown. It is clear that, in both cases, the simulation results lie between the lower and upper bounds, which well verifies the secrecy outage analysis for the primary network in Section IV. Specifically, when the average SS → E channel is small (λ se = 5 dB) or large (λ se = 70 dB), the simulation results are close to the upper bounds. This is because, at the eavesdropper, the signals from SS can be ignored when λ se is small or successfully decoded and subtracted from the received signal when λ se is large. For other SS → E channel gains, the simulation results lie between the upper and lower bounds. Comparing Fig. 2(a) and (b) also reveals that Case 1 has better secrecy performance than Case 2. This is as expected because Case 1 has the knowledge of the SD → E jamming channel, and Case 2 does not. Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probabilities versus M = λ de /λ dp , where we set I th = 1, the secrecy target rate as R st = 4 b/s/Hz, and the average gain ratio L = λ pe /λ pp = −5 dB. Fig. 3 verifies the following analysis.
• In both Cases 1 and 2, the secrecy performance of the primary network improves with more jamming antennas.
• In both Cases 1 and 2, the secrecy diversity orders for all jamming antenna numbers K 2 are always 1, as given by (50) and (54), respectively. For example, for K 2 = 5 in Case 1, when M increases from 40 to 50 dB, the secrecy outage probability approximately drops from −37 to −47 dB.
• In Case 1, the secrecy coding gain is 10 log 10 (K 2 − 1), as given by (52). For example, for M = 50 dB, the secrecy outage difference between K 2 = 2 and K 2 = 5 is about 6 dB, which well matches the theoretical coding gain for K 2 = 5 as 10 log 2 (5 − 1) ≈ 6 dB. Note that, in Case 1, the baseline system for coding gain definition is based on K 2 = 2.
• In Case 2, the secrecy coding gain is 10 log 10 (K 2 ), as given by (56). For example, for M = 50 dB, the secrecy outage difference between K 2 = 5 and K 2 = 1 is about 7 dB, which well matches the theoretical coding gain for K 2 = 5 as 10 log 10 (5) ≈ 7 dB. Note that, in Case 1, the baseline system for coding gain definition is based on K 2 = 1. Thus, Fig. 3 clearly shows that, in both Cases 1 and 2, the jamming antenna selection at the secondary destination leads to coding gain rather than the diversity gain in the secrecy outage probability. Fig. 4 shows the outage probability for data transmission in the secondary network versus N = λ sd /λ pd , where we set the target data rate in the secondary network as R t = 4 b/s/Hz, λ sp = λ pd = 20 dB, and the power constraint level as I th = 1 or 3. Both the simulation and theoretical results are presented, which are shown to be perfectly match. It is clearly shown in Fig. 4 that, for both I th = 1 and 3, the outage probability decreases with more receiving antennas, and the improvement is clearly from the diversity gain. This well verifies the analysis in Section III that the antenna selection leads to the diversity gain for the data transmission in the secondary network.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed the dual antenna selection scheme in the secure CR network. This was achieved by applying full-duplex transmission at the secondary user. The outage probability for both the data transmission in the secondary network and secrecy performance in the primary network were analyzed, where the analysis showed that the antenna selection leads to diversity gain for the secondary data transmission and coding gain for the primary secrecy performance, respectively. Numerical simulation results were also shown to well verify the analysis in this paper. Both the analysis and simulations showed that the proposed scheme describes an attractive scheme in the secure CR network.
